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vs. 
RO,VLAND S. BINGHAM and 
KATHERINE C. BINGHAM, 
his wife, et al, 
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No. 
10,831 
Defendants' - Respondents' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as the facts developed at the trial are 
very important to a decision of this case, and because 
defendants take sharp issue with many of the assertions 
of fact made by the plaintiff in its brief, it is felt that 
a complete restatement of the facts is in order. If the 
actual facts were as simple as those stated by plaintiff, 
its position might have a degree of merit; however, the 
facts are otherwise. 
1 
The defendants owned a tract of land, consisting 
of 9.4 acres, located in Riverdale, Weber County, Utah, 
through which the plaintiff ran a portion of its Inter- , 
state Freeway (Exh. I). This particular tract of land 
lay on a bluff, or bench area, above the older settled , 
portion of Riverdale ( T. 7) , and was in an area which , 
was being converted from orchard to residential use 
(T. IO). At the time of the condemnation the entire 
tract was considered by all of the appraisers as having 
a highest and best use for residential purposes, with ' 
an interim orchard use during the necessary conversion 
period. 
This particular property was choice property, both 1 
for orchard and residential purposes (T. 46, 47, 83, 84), 
and the appraisers for both the landowners and the , 
state variously valued all of the acres in the tract be- ' 
tween $3,500.00 and $4,500.00 per acre. In its original ' 
condition the entire tract sloped slightly from the south-
east to the northwest, at which point it fronted upon ' 
I200 West Street, where there were located the usual 
utilities ( T. 9) of electricity, telephone, gas, water and , 
sewer. Riverdale zoning (T. IO) for the subject prop· 
erty permitted either agricultural use or residential ' 
building lots having not less than I0,000 square feet per 
lot. 
-As shown on Exhibit I, and from the resolution 
of taking set forth in the Amended Complaints, the 
plaintiff not only took a strip of land on the westerly 
end of the entire Bingham holdings where direct access ' 
to I200 West Street was located, but it further con· 
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demned all of the access rights to the remaining lands 
east of the freeway along their South border against 
Riverdale Ro.ad. The Exhibit further shows a narrow 
triangular piece of land on the East boundary of the 
remaining tract, owned by Hank Dee, which was a steep 
hill property along the top of which ran the East line 
of the Binghams' remaining tract-at a location ap-
proximately 26 feet higher than 1500 West Street (T. 
18). Thus, the only logical appearing route to secure 
aecess to some road system from the remaining tract 
would have to lie in a northerly direction, as will be 
subsequently discussed. 
Plaintiff states in its brief that these defendants 
operated their properties-which were previously por-
tions of their father's larger farm-as a family opera-
tion; however, the facts are to the contrary. A reading 
of Mr. Bingham's testimony (T. 29) indicates that it 
was operated as a family farm prior to the time that 
the three sons (of which Roland Bingham was one) 
acquired their own individual tracts. Actually, Roland 
Bingham and his wife had for many years secured their 
entire living from the orchard located on the 9.4 acre 
tract, except for some supplemental income derived 
from driving a Weber County school bus (T. 10). 
Taking issue with another statement of fact made 
by plaintiff in its brief to the effect that Roland Bing-
ham prepared plans and had discussions with his broth-
ers for a joint subdivision development of their prop-
erties (Br. 3), Roland Bingham testified that he had 
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worked up sketches for a proposed subdivision of his 
own property (utilizing the prior access to 1200 West 
Street) before the freeway came into the picture (T. 
32-33), but that when he attempted to sketch alternate 
subdivision plans involving his brother's property lo-
cated north of his remaining landlocked tract after 
knowledge of the freeway came into being, his brother 
stated: "I don't want to fool with it" (T. 32-33). 
Because plaintiff treated another matter as being 
a fact, to-wit: that Ezra Bingham owned the land to 
·the north of the landlocked tract (Br. 12) , a clarifi-
cation of the facts in this respect is in order. Actually, 
there were two separate properties lying north of the 
landlocked tract between it and the nearest highway. 
One parcel was owned by Ezra Bingham and his wife 
Helen ( T. 24) . The other parcel, lying contiguous to 
and on the north side of the Ezra Bingham tract, was 
owned by another brother, Golden Bingham (T. 26). 
Critical to any factual analysis of this case is the 
statement made on page 7 of plaintiff's brief, as fol-
lows: 
" there is no dispute to the proposition 
that if access was available they would have no 
d " severance amage. 
The foregoing statement is unsupported by any 
reference to the record and is sharply controverted by 
defendants. The true facts will be covered in subse-
quent argument. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN A CONDEM-
~ A'l'ION PROCEEDING IS ON THE CON-
DE~INOR TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE WHICH 
l\IINll\11.ZES THE DAMAGES TO THE 
LANDOWNER'S REMAINING PROPER-
TIES. 
The State Road Commission, in its brief, suggests 
that before the landowners can obtain any severance 
damage whatsoever they must show by evidence the 
unavailability of substitute lands which would cure the 
problems connected with loss of access. As authority 
for this proposition the State cites the two Utah cases 
of Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 
Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777 (1943), and State v. Coopera-
tive Security Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints, 122 Utah 134, 247 P. 2d 269 (1952). How-
ever, neither of these two cases squarely faced the issue 
of burden of proof in convincing the jury of the avoid-
ance or minimization of damages, nor did they speci-
fically mention burden of proof or expressly impose 
the burden of proof on a particular party. 
In contradistinction with these two cases the gen-
eral rule, sometimes referred to as the "doctrine of 
avoidable consequences", expressly imposes the burden 
of proof upon the party committing the wrong. 25A 
C.J.S., Damages, Section 144 e (1966). In speaking 
of this doctrine of avoidable consequences, the State 
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quotes from page 127 of McCormick on Damages 
( 1935) . Turning to page 130 of the same section of 
this treatise the author speaks of the burden of proof. 
"Nevertheless, though by the better view the 
defendant need not plead it, he does have the bur-
den of proof. He must bring forward evidence 
that the plaintiff could reasonably have reduced 
his loss or avoided injurious consequences, and 
he must finally convince the jury of this in order 
to succeed on this issue." 
It is obvious from the above quotation that the 
general rule as applied to non-condemnation cases is 
there expressed. In a condemnation case the labels of 
the parties are merely reversed. Nevertheless, the gen- ' 
eral rule expressly states that the uninjured party must , 
bring forward evidence that the injured party could 
reasonably have reduced his loss or avoided injurious 
consequences. 
The reporters abound with non-condemnation cases 
which impose the burden of proof on the uninjured 
party. However, citations will be reserved for eminent 
domain cases. 
In 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Burden of Proof, 
Section 18.5, is discussed the minority rule placing 
upon the condemnor the burden of showing the extent 
of damages. In referring to those jurisdictions, such 
as Utah, where the burden of showing damages is upon 
the landowner, the writer states on page 301: 
"Even in those jurisdictions where the general 
rule prevails, the burden is on the condemnor to 
6 
produce evidence which mznzmzzes the value or 
damage." 
(Emphasis added). 
As authority for the above statement of law 
Nichols cites the Utah case of Sigurd City v. State, 
105 Utah 278, 142 P. 2d 154 (1943). That case and 
the cases cited therein are the only Utah cases found 
by this writer which directly and expressly deal with 
the issue of burden of proof in minimizing damages. 
The Sigurd City case was a condemnation case 
i1wo1Ying the condemnation by a municipal corporation 
of water rights held by the State of Utah and other 
' . 
private individuals. The condemnor sought by the action 
to diYert waters at the head of Rosses Creek. Rosses 
Creek flowed into Petersons Creek, which in turn 
flowed into .Meadow Creek. Defendants diverted their 
water for irrigation at points on the latter two streams. 
During the course of the trial experts testified as to 
the loss of water between the diversion points by evapo-
ration and seepage. Considering the evaporation and 
seepage this Court held that the trial court erred in 
basing defendants' damages upon the quantity of water 
taken by plaintiff and not the quantity of water which 
defendants would have placed to a beneficial use and 
which they were actually deprived of at their diversion 
points. 
'Vith regard to this minimization of damages hy 
proof that the volume of water taken by the plaintiff 
was less than the volume of that to whi~h use the de-
7 
fendants were deprived, this Court stated on page 158: 
"In determining the volume and quantity of 
water, the use of which the defendants were de-
prived of, the burden is on the plaintiff to show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the de-
fendants were not deprived of the use of as much 
water as the plaintiff took into its pipelines at 
Rosses Creek. Howcroft v. Union & Jordan Irr. 
Co., 25 Utah 311, 71P.487; Mountain Like Min-
ing Co. v. JJfidway Irr. Co., 47 Utah 346, 149 
P. 929; Silver King Consol. Mining Co. v. Sut- ' 
ton, 85 Utah 297, 39 P. 2d 682; Midway Irr. Co. 
v. Smoke Creek JJf. & T. Co. 8 Cir. 271 F. 157, ' 
affirmed, 260 U. S. 596, 43 S. Ct. 215, 67 L. Ed. 
423; Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 P. 
1092." 
(Emphasis added). 
The rule as stated in the Sigurd City case is in con-
sonance with every case or authority found by this 
writer where the issue of burden of proof was expressly 
ruled upon. In fact, the two Utah cases of Provo River 
Water Users' Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 
777 (1943), and State v. Cooperative Security Corp. , 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 122 Utah 134, 
247 P. 2d 269 (1952), stand alone as the only two 
cases found by this writer in any jurisdiction where 
there is any inference that the burden of showing a 
reduction in his own damages is placed upon the de-
fendant landowner in a condemnation case. Further· 
more, any inference from these two cases that the 
burden of proof is upon the landowner is in direct con· 
flict with the express language of this Court in the 
Sigurd City case. 
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The Carlson case was the first of these two cases 
decided by this Court. As sole authority for the propo-
sition that the landowner should minimize the damages 
to his remaining lands by the purchase of comparable 
lands, this Court cited the case of City of St. Louis v. 
St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 272 Mo. 80, 197 S. W. 
107 (1917). A thorough reading of the St. Louis case 
reveals that at no place within that opinion was the bur-
den of proof of factors minimizing damages ever dis-
cussed. However, that opinion does make it clear that af-
tirmative evidence was adduced at the trial showing the 
arnilability of an equally commodious, convenient, eco-
nomical, and accessible parcel for $51,000.00. That testi-
mony was obviously elicited by the condemning agency. 
In the case at bar no such evidence was brought before 
the court. The State of Utah has utterly failed to show 
by affirmative evidence the availability of comparable 
land for access purposes such as will replace the land-
owners to their status quo ante capiendum. 
That the Carlso1L case merely assumed the burden 
to be on the landowner, without so deciding, is made 
clear by the dissent of Justice Larson on page 783: 
"The prevailing opinion assumes the burden 
was on Carlson to show he could not retrieve his 
losses by the purchase of other lands. It is ele-
mental that the condemnor has the burden of 
showing off sets or other facts which might lessen 
the damages directly resulting or other facts 
which might lessen the damages directly resulting 
to the condemnee from the interference with his 
property rights." 
(Emphasis added). 
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The Church Farm case was decided some 10 years 
after the Carlson case and cited the latter case and the 
St. Louis case as authority. Again this Court made no 
specific mention of the burden of proof but did refer 
to the requirement that the proof show that no com-
parable lands were available in the area of the con-
demned land. The Court held against the landowner 
since the evidence affirmatively showed the availability 
of comparable land. That the State proved the avail-
ability of comparable lands is made clear on page 272, 
where the Court said: 
"Since the evidence shows that this property 
could have been replaced there was no basis for 
the award of severance damage except as to the r 
two small tracts." 
Cases such as the Sigurd City case, where the court 
specifically imposed upon the condemnor the burden 
of showing by clear and convincing evidence factors 
tending to reduce or mitigate damages, are to be found 
in a number of states. In fact, the authorities are so 
uniform that the rule has been stated in general form 1 
by legal encyclopedias. 
"The condemnor must prove that it has com-
plied with statutory requirements that it en- 1 
deavor to agree with the landowner as to the com-
pensation; and it is for the condemnor to show 
matters which tend to reduce or mitigate the dam-
ages. The condemning authority also has the 
burden of showing facts excusing delay in the 
payment of the damages." 29A C.J.S., Eminent 
Domain, Section 271. 
(Emphasis added). 
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This quotation by C.J.S. was cited with approval 
in the case of Roth v. Sanitary Dist. No. 1 of Lancas-
ter County, 156 Neb. 444, 56 N. W. 2d 741 (1953). 
Also in the Nebraska case of Application of Platte Val-
ley Public Power & Irr. Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 N eh. 
609, 620, 68 N. W. 2d 200 (1955), where the issue dealt 
with the admissibility of photographs depicting topog-
raphy, the court stated: 
"The general rule is that the burden of show-
ing the damages which the landowner or lessee 
will suffer rests on him while the burden is on 
the petitioner to show matters which end to miti-
gate the damages." 
The case of Application of Board of Ed. of Union 
Free School District, 216 N. Y. S. 2d 811, 816 (N. Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1961), offers an interesting twist on the facts 
here presented. In that case the land involved was ap-
parently originally landlocked. 
"As above noted, petitioner also argues that 
all of the lots on the Mess11pequa Park map must 
be depreciated 65% because they are landlocked. 
Of course, if property is landlocked, its value 
is substantially reduced, ... The burden of proof 
of the value of a damage (sic) parcel is upon 
the claimant, but the burden of going forward 
with evidence establishing matters which mini-
mize or mitigate claimants' damages is on the 
condemning authority, ... " (Citing authority). 
The cases of State v. Dunclick, 286 P. 2d 1112 
(Idaho 1955), and Jeffery v. Osborne, 145 Wis. 351, 
129 N. W. 931 (1911), can both be cited for the propo-
11 
sition that the condemning authority has the burden 
of proving the availability of comparable lands which 
will mitigate or substantially eliminate the severance 
damage caused the landowner. In both of these cases the 
condemnor failed to carry its burden of proof. 
As can be seen from a reading of the two cases, 
the burden placed upon the condemnor is not a simple 
one of merely showing the availability of a nearby 
tract of land. The Wisconsin case makes it clear that 
the courts are extremely reluctant to force the land-
owner to swap land for the accommodation of the con-
demnor. In that case the court held that the availability 
of other lands in the immediate vicinity at a moderate 
price could not be shown to reduce the damages tu 
which the landowner was entitled. It was said to be 
immaterial that the landowner could move part of his 
plant to other land for the purpose of giving the con-
demnor a right-of-way. 
In the Idaho case the court specifically found that 
the respondent (State) had not carried its burden of 
proof by merely offering to sell an adjacent tract owned 
by the State of Idaho. The Court required more detail , 
and specificity in the following language found on 
page 1114: 
<, 
"The consideration to be paid, or conditions 
under which the convey~1ce tendered could or 
would be made to appellants, the cost of improv· ' 
ing the claimed available land to make it adapt-
able to appellant's use, the cost of re-adjustment 
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to appellants' plant to make practical use of the 
new location, or what sum would necessarily be 
required to be expended in order to rehabilitate 
the property for such use and replace the plant 
in status quo ante capiendum were not shown. 
If respondent desires to prove facts for the 
purpose of mitigating or minimizing the damages 
sustained to the remainder, proof of availability 
or other land adjacent to appellants' plant, stand-
ing alone with nothing more, is insufficient for 
such purpose." 
A Utah case similar to the latter two cited cases 
is Southern Pacific Cornpany v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 
306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960). In that case this Court held 
that evidence of the unavailability of other lands would 
be immaterial because other lands would not return 
the damaged tract to its status quo ante capiendum by 
serving the same purpose. 
This same requirement that the substitute lands 
should be so comparable as to leave the landowner in 
substantially the same position as before the taking is 
laid down in the Church Farm case, supra, and in the 
Carlson case, supra. The Carlson opinion particularly 
is replete with words and phrases requiring that the 
substitute land give the same relative results. 
"The purchase of a tract of land which pro-
duces the sarne relative results Carlson obtained 
from the pasture tract prior to condemnation, 
offsetting the advantages against the disadvan-
tages, would be the controlling factor in the de-
termination of market value of the pasture con-
demned, whether a greater or lesser acreage 
13 
would be required, due consideration being given 
to type and amount of feed produced, water 
available, and the location of the land with re-
spect to other properties owned by Carlson. , 
If he could purchase other pasture lands or farm 
land convertible into pasture, within a distance 
from his barns comparable to that of the con-
demned tract, and such other land would pro-
vide relatively the same kind of forage for the 
same number of cows or forage of equal ration-
value throughout the seven months he used the 
wild pasture tract, it could not be contended that 
his properties in Charleston could be impaired or 
depreciated by taking the pasture. If another tract 
of equal forage-producing value and convenience 
could be substituted for the tract condemned, 
whether larger or smaller in area, the defendant 
would be in relatively the same positon he was in 
before the construction of the reservoir. See City 
of St. Louis v. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co., 272 
Mo. 80, 197 S. ,V. 107." (Emphasis addedL 
Provo River 1Vater Users Ass'n v. Carlson, 
103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777, 781 (1943). 
The cited authority of the Carlson case, City of St. 
Louis v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 272 Mo. 80, 197 
S. W. 107, 112 (1917), is even more specific as to the 
requirement that the substitute lands serve the identical 
function. 
"In cases where no available property is owned 
bv him whose land is taken, the price at which 
other lands adjacent, equally as valuable intrin· 
sically, as convenient, as economical in use, and 
as accessible, and which can be bought, may. be 
shown as measuring the amount of depreciat10n 
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to which the lands damaged but not physically 
taken, have been subjected." 
(Emphasis added). 
The placing of the burden of proving avoidance 
or minimization of damages upon the condemning 
ageuc:y is based upon both case authority and sound 
reasoning. Sound reasoning dictates that proof be af-
firmative and specific. Only the condemnor is motivated 
to show affirmatively that a particular tract of land 
is arnilable as a replacement for land taken. Only the 
eondemnor is motivated to show affirmatively that a 
particular piece of land is equally as a convenient, eco-
nomical, and accessible as the tract taken. For the 
larnlowuer to obtain the degree of specificity required 
by case law and still show the unavailability of all 
nearby tracts is an onerous burden. By an affirmative 
showing of availability the State could carry its burden 
with minimal use of valuable judicial time; however, 
the landowner would be required to negative the avail-
ability of many nearby tracts at the expense of time 
in order to carry the burden were such burden to be 
imposed upon him. 
The cases cited by plaintiff involve situations 
where, by the acquisition of property similar and com-
parable to the properties taken, a property unit can be 
brought back to its former utility and use in substan-
tially all respects. On the other hand, it is easy to realize 
that few cases involving mitigation of damages can be 
found where a tract of land has become landlocked as 
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a result of condemnation action. In the ordinary case 
it would of ten be extremely difficult to furnish a prop-
erty owner with access to a landlocked parcel of land 
which would measure up to the type of access pre-
viously had, thereby creating serious problems as to 
the amount of mitigation of damages. 
\Vhile the principle of mitigation of damages should 
certainly be applicable to landlocked parcels, the access 
problem and resulting damages should properly be 
related to a consideration of the evidence submitted 
by both sides rather than handled through the route 
of what in fact would constitute, as plaintiff would 
have it, a motion for a non-suit. 
As a matter of fact, in both the CarlYon and the 
Church Farrn cases, the evidence relating to the other 
available lands, while not precisely in point with the 
problem here involved since they were not access cases, 
was raised by the condemnor' s cross-examination or by 
its evidence showing the availability of other lands. 
Coming more specifically to the access problem 
and the evidence in this case, the plaintiff did in fact 
explore what appeared to it to be the only logical means , 
of furni.shing defendants with physical access to their 
remaining properties. As shown by the Complaint and 
State's Exhibit I, there existed a 20 foot wide "legal 
opening" at the northeast corner of the defendants' 
remaining 6.44 acre tract of land (parcel A), bordering 
1500 \Vest Street in Riverdale. This opening was lo-
16 
1 
' 
I• 
cated at a point, according to YVilliam l\1arsden-the 
plaintiff's engineer - which was 12 feet higher than 
1.)00 \Yest Street (T. llO), but well below the top of 
;1 -;teep ridge bordering 1500 'Vest Street, which ridge 
or bank was about 26 feet high ( T. 18). To get an idea 
as to the physical appearance of the ridge or bank 
bordering the east side of the defendants' remaining 
rroperty, one need only look at defendants' Exhibit 
l;. This Exhibit shows the east bank (looking westerl~· 
from 1.)00 "'est Street, the top portion of which ran 
aloug the entire east line of defendants' remaining land-
locked property. 
It was in the vicinity of this particular bank that 
the plaintiff did in fact attempt to work out some means 
of acx:ess for defendants so as to reach their remaining 
properties. Plaintiff's engineer, l\Ir .. Marsden, actually 
disc:ussed the possibility of an access route in that area 
with Roland Bingham ( T. l13). In fact, l\Ir .. Marsden 
admitted that the State Road Commission engaged 
Templeton Engineers, a private engineering firm, to 
study the general area to determine if an access could 
he made ( T. 1 H). Also, l\Ir. :Marsden personally un-
dertook to study the possibility of an access to the re-
maining properties and made the following obsena-
tions on cross-examination by l\fr. Fuller: 
A .... but I know that it was very difficult to 
provide a route directly west along the north-
erly property line. But I don't recall what 
we tried to do to the south, along the easterly 
property line. 
* * * 
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Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Bingham that you 
viewed the access at that point to be im-
possible, except at a great amount of money! 
A. Yes. The money that I testified to earlier 
would only be the portion that would have 
to be spent right at that location. Not the 
total amount required to do the entire job. 
(T. ll5) 
Mr. Marsden indicated that any access which might 
be created in the indicated area would only serve for 
possible agricultural uses, and that it would not be 
adequate for purposes related to the highest and best 
use of the properties for residential construction. His 
comments continue on further cross-examination by 
Mr. Fuller: 
Q. Am I correct, or not, in this assumption. 
That from your observation and study of this 
particular area, to put a road into the Bing-
ham property that would suitably accomplish 
the desired access, would be too costly from 
an economic standpoint? Is that true or not? 
A. It would depend on what purpose the road 
was placed there for. In other words is this 
a rural access or is this an urban access? 
Q. Let's take an urban access. 
A. It would be very costly for an urban access. 
(T. ll8) 
On re-cross examination Mr. Marsden continued: 
Q. So one would come in with agricultural 
equipment. at that point, and make a rather 
sharp turn? 
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A. That is correct. 
Q. And come on up that property to some point 
near the south end, where it would finally 
level out? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You would not propose that type of an entry 
or approach for an urban-type development, 
would you? 
A. No. 
MR. FULLER: No further questions. 
(T. 120) 
Mr. Marsden's entire testimony relating to any 
possible means of access at the east end of the land-
locked properties necessarily contemplated a possible 
use of the properties belonging to the neighbor on the 
east-Hank Dee. However, since the Dee property 
was built against this same bank on the west side of 
1500 \Vest Street, the possible availability of a portion 
of that property for an approach road to the defend-
ants' properties would have added nothing, nor would 
it have simplified the problems testified to by Mr. 
Marsden. 
~rhen Roland Bingham was recalled for further 
examination he further substantiated Mr. Marsden's 
analysis of the access problem, stating that Mr. Marsden 
told him on the telephone-
" ... That the State had secured a private 
engineer to try to figure means of entry to this 
property." 
(T. 153) 
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Further, l\Ir. l\Iarsden informed Bingham as tr! 
any means of access, that-
" 'It's impossible, but nothing is impossible if 
you have got plenty of money.' And that's as far 
as it went." 
(T. 15oJ 
The suggestion made by plaintiff in its brief that 
an alternate route could be secured from the north of 
the landlocked parcel through lands belonging to 
brothers of the defendants is here submitted to hare 
been simply an afterthought which was never seriously 
contemplated by the plaintiff. It was only after thi1 
"possible", but unsatisfactory, route came into the case 
through witnesses for the defendant that the State 
took any cognizance of such an approach. Oddly ' 
enough, in its brief plaintiff now seeks to suggest a 
northerly route to reach the landlocked property, Lut 
is strangely quiet as to the only route which it in fact 
seriously felt furnished any kind of access route. A ~ 
further discussion of this point will be handled in the 
next point of argument. 
Recognizing the type of problem that exists in such 
a situation as we have here, the Utah legislature in 19!5.3 , 
added the following pertinent provisions to the Utah 
Highway Code: 
27-12-96 ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS-
OF-'V A Y AND OTHER REAL PROP-
ER TY - The commission is authorized to ac-
quire any real property or interests therein, 
deemed necessary for temporary, present, or 
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reasonable future state highway purposes by 
gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemna-
tion, or otherwise. Highway purposes as used in 
this act shall include, but shall not be limited to 
the fallowing: 
( 3) Limited access facilities, including rights 
of access, air, light and view, and frontage and 
service roads to highways. 
27-12-99 - ACQUISITION OF ENTIRE 
LOT, BLOCK OR TRACT - SALE OF 
REl\:IAINDER - 'Vhenever a part of an entire 
lot, block or tract of land or interests therein or 
improvements thereon is to be acquired by the 
commission and the remainder is to be left in 
such shape or condition as to be of little value to 
its owner or to give rise to claims or litigation 
concerning damages, the commission may acquire 
the whole of the same and may ull the remainder 
or may exchange the same for other property 
needed for highway purposes. 
(I tali cs added) 
It is clear that the vast impact of the Federal high-
way system sponsored the foregoing legislation in Utah 
and many other states, and that it provided that the 
plaintiff could have either ( 1) condemned or otherwise 
acquired an access to defendants' remaining properties 
from other possible routes (as it obviously tried to do), 
or (2) it could have made an outright purchase of the 
physically landlocked properties of defendants. How-
ever, rather than follow either of the procedures pro-
vided by statute, plaintiff sought to unfairly gamble 
with defendants in the hope of leaving the problem with 
the defendants-and at a minimum cost to itself. 
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The statute is amply clear that plaintiff could have 
purchased the landlocked properties and then resold 
them, had it felt the access problem was not severe, and 
thereby reduced its costs. Also, since the pleadings 
1 
(as shown on the maps which accompany the Complaint i 
for the purpose of showing the route of the highway 
1 
and the properties affected) clearly show that the lands · 
of Ezra Bingham (a brother) and other individuals 
lying to the north of defendants were also being ac-
quired for highway purposes, it would have been a 
very simple matter for plaintiff to have added to the 
lands taken from such other individuals enough addi· 
tional lands to furnish these defendants with an access , 
to their remaining properties had the plaintiff so con-
cluded. The only conclusion which can be reached under 
the evidence from the failure of the plaintiff to act con-
sistent with its statutory authority is that the Road 
Commission long ago decided that it was impractical 
to attempt to secure access to the landlocked properties 
from either the east side (where the high bank was 
located) or from a northerly approach. 
Citing the Mississippi case of Highway Commis-
sion v. Morgan, 175 So. 2d 606 (Miss. 1965), which 
contains statutory provisions similar to those of Utah, 
just previously set forth, the general rule is stated in 
1 
26 American Jurisprudence 2nd, Sec. 72, as follows: 
"Also, it has been held that a state may prop· 
erly condemn land ... for the purpose of fur-
nishing a means of access to and egress from 
parcels of private property cut off by a limited-
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access highway. In matters of this kind, it is 
recognized that the public officials exercising the 
power of eminent domain ought undoubtedly to 
minimize the damage as far as is reasonably 
'bl ,, possz e, ... 
(Emphasis added). 
The same rule is stated in 2 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain in Sec. 7.226 where, concerning the issue of 
whether or not substitute lands may be acquired by 
eminent domain by a condemnor in the same or in a 
supplemental proceeding for the use of an owner, the 
question was stated: 
" ... Is such a secondary acquisition of prop-
erty to be considered for a public use? 
"The question has been answered in the affirm-
ative not only in jurisdictions which subscribe 
to the liberal interpretation of 'public use' but 
even in those where. the narrow doctrine ordi-
narily prevails ... " 
In concluding the discussion relating to mitigation 
of damages, it is submitted that this Court should fur-
ther consider the general situation present in this coun-
try today where eminent domain proceedings are simply 
flooding the courts and reluctant property owners are 
being forced to litigate what they consider unsatis-
factory offers. Faced with access problems of the type 
here involved, is it really fair to shift the burden of 
mitigating damages in such uncertain and involved 
situations to landowners who must pay their own legal 
expenses, hire expert appraisals, and stand many costs 
which are not compensated for under the law-par-
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ticularly where the State has been provided with ample 
statutory authority and means to work out remedial 
measures in situations of this very type? Eminent 
domain as a pp lied to property owners is a harsh pro-
ceeding brought in derogation of the most fundamental 
legal concept-i.e., ownership of real property-under-
lying the common law. And, as the complexities of 
problems involving damages become greater with the 
advent of limited- and non-access highways, it becomes 
abundantly clear that justice requires the greater bur-
den respecting mitigation of damages to be faced by 
the condemnor. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTAB· 
LISHED THAT THE DEFENDANTS COULD 
NOT HA VE SECURED ANY COMP ARABLE 
ACCESS TO THEIR REMAINING LANDS 
WHICH WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY 
ELI~fINATED THEIR SEVERANCE DAM· 
AGES. 
As pointed out in the preceding point of argument, 
any access which defendants might have secured to 
their remaining 6.44 acre parcel of land from either 
the east side or the north side would have to be sub-
stantially comparable and of such type as to place 
defendants basically in a position such as they enjoyed 
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before. This is the clear mandate of the Church Farm 
and the Carlson cases, supra, and the City of St. Louis 
case. The facts of this case-even if a substitute access 
could in fact have been secured-much more nearly fit 
the situation of Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 
supra, since any possible means of access would not 
return the damaged tract to its status quo ante capi-
endum. 
The facts and argument set forth in defendants' 
discussion under the preceding point clearly establish 
the utter lack of feasibility, both from the standpoint 
of cost and limitations upon use, of any possible ap-
proach over the large bank running along the east side 
above 1500 West Street. That possibility was con-
sidered both by the landowners and by the plaintiff's 
engineer. Consequently, the only possible remaining 
route from the remaining tract to a highway system 
of any kind lay in a northerly direction. As to such 
a route, defendants submit ( 1) that in fact it was not 
arnilable, and (2) that, even if it were available, the 
costs and other factors surrounding such a route would 
prove it to be grossly inadequate as a comparable suit-
able substitute access. 
Mr. Bingham testified on direct examination that 
he did in fact consider trying to secure a route to the 
north from his brothers (T. 24), but that he was unable 
to do so. He pointed out ( T. 24) that the first property 
to the north of him was owned by his brother 1;.zra, 
and his wife, Helen; and that his brother was not anxious 
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to sell at the time. Further, the brother indicated that 
the sale of a right-of-way would ruin " ... either end 
of my property ... ", and that Roland Bingham would 
have to buy it all or nothing (T. 25). Although no 
price was set for the adjoining pr~perties-obviously 
since any sale would require the concurrence of Ezra's 
wife, Helen-an examination of Exhibit I clearly 
shows a parcel of at least the same size as the remain· 
ing tract belonging to these defendants. Further, the 
record indicates the value of the lands of these defend-
ants, and it can hardly be imagined that the lands of 
1 
Ezra Bingham (together with the home and buildings 
thereon) would sell at any less price per acre. 
However, and notwithstanding the remote posssi-
bility of being able to deal with his brother, Roland 1 
Bingham pointed out that the relationships between 
himself and his wife with Ezra's wife had been some· 
what strained in recent years (T. 25). Mr. Bingham 
pointed out that their families had not associated socially 
"in years", and that so long as each stayed on his own 
ground there were no problems, " ... but if we don't 
there is." Roland Bingham pointed out that he had 
not visited Ezra or his wife in their home, nor had he 
ever been in their home, since 1951. 
Mr. Bingham did not testify as to whether or not 
he could have secured an access through the properties 
of his brother, Golden Bingham, lying north of the 
properties of Ezra and Helen Bingham, which prop· 
erties would have to be crossed ( T. 26, 100) in order 
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to reach 1200 West Street, since such further inves-
tigation would obviously appear to be wasted time. 
Nor do we have any evidence as to what price he would 
have had to pay Golden Bingham for his lands, or 
a portion thereof, including any allowance for damages 
to those lands or to the home of Golden Bingham and 
the outbuildings surrounding the home. 
Another problem presented itself in that any pos-
sible access from the defendants' remaining tract in 
a northerly direction could only reach 1500 West Street 
from an indefinite point farther north, and by an obvi-
ously circuitous route (as can be seen from an exami-
nation of Exhibit I) necessary to drop off the bench 
properties down to that road, or else the route would 
have had to proceed northerly to an intersection with 
1200 'Vest Street. As to this latter street, the freeway 
intersected it completely, and the portion of 1200 West 
Street lying east of the freeway (and northerly of 
the properties belonging to the brothers and wives) 
was thereby made a dead-end road. On Exhibit I that 
portion of 1200 West Street was shown on the State's 
map (Exh. 1) as: "1200 WEST STREET ABAN-
DON (ED) EAST OF FREE,VAY." Accordingly, 
any access to that former road system would naturally 
have questionable future upkeep, service, utility and 
legal status as a road. 
Coming to the next aspect of this portion of the 
argument, let us assume that somehow an actual road-
way could have been secured from the two brothers 
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from a northerly direction to the remammg tract of 
these defendants. Because of the steep bank running 
on the west side of 1500 'Vest Street, and because of 
the angle of 1200 West Street in a northeasterly direc-
tion, it is rather obvious that the roadway would have 
to be designed so as to enter near the northwest corner 
of the landlocked property. Under the evidence, and 
from a knowledge of a few simple facts present in all 
such situations, defendants submit that plaintiff is 
simply exercising wild hopes when it states (Br. 7) 
that " ... if access was available they would have no 
severance damage." Such a statement is both disputed 
and unsupportable. 
An analysis of this problem must first consider the 
highest and best use of the subject properties for resi-
dential subdivision purposes (T. 47, 83, 84), with an 
interim productive use of orchard purposes during the 
transitional period. Accordingly, any access which 
would meet the tests of the Church Farm case and the 
Carlson case would necessarily have to substantially 
satisfy both uses. Also let's look at some simple facts: 
common sense and a drive through a subdivision will 
point out that any road from a northerly direction to 
the landlocked tract would have to proceed southerly 
from 1200 West Street at a sufficient distance from 
the freeway fence as would permit the placing of lots 
on both sides of the street. This is so because certain 
utilities-such as water mains and sewer mains-must 
serve lots on both sides in order for the construction 
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costs of such improvements to be practical in any sense. 
This is also true as to street graveling, grading and 
hard surfacing. 'Ve are thus left with the conclusion 
that any access would have to come down to the land-
locked piece from the north at a distance from the free-
way fence which would put it out into the fields of 
Golden Bingham and Ezra Bingham. Not only would 
this constitute an expensive matter in terms of land 
costs (a severance damage to be considered) to these 
defendants, but one can readily imagine the severance 
damaged caused to the properties of the two brothers 
of these defendants (which, also, would be measured as 
part of the damages to these defendants' properties-
ordinarily measured on the basis of a "cost-to-cure" 
approach). Such damages become obvious because a 
roadway in their fields would disrupt the irrigation 
patterns of the lands involved, would result in a reduc-
tion in size of the orchard properties belonging to the 
brothers ( T. 26) , and would cross an area where young 
Christmas trees have been planted (T. 26)-thereby 
reducing the size of the economic units of the brothers 
and making them less productive. 
Mr. Bingham's appraiser, George Maw, stated 
that, except for the 6.44 acre tract being smaller-and 
harder to develop, the remainder of the damages would 
not have been present if the tract in fact had " ... 
the same accessibility, ... " that it previously had. 
However, Mr. Maw could not find any possibility of 
securing the "same accessibility" ( T. 7 4) . 
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Considering another aspect of the possibility of 
a route from the north to the 6.44 acre tract, in addi-
tion to the cost of the land for such a route (and sever-
ance damages caused to the lands of the property 
owners giving up such a route) there is the further 
problem of whether such a route would be as good 
in fact as the frontage this same property previously 
enjoyed. As heretofore stated, the 6.44 acre tract was 
connected through the freeway area in its former con-
dition to 1200 'Vest Street, where all necessary utilities 
were located. Any orderly development of the original 
property would have started at the broad frontage on 
1200 West Street and progressed orderly to the east. 
The future situation would not be that simple because 
it now appears that, even with a possible access road 
from the north, the 6.44 acre tract is at a much farther 
distance from any regularly travelled and maintained 
road system. It is obvious that this condition would 
defer development and reduce the value, for that rea· 
son alone, of the 6.44 acre tract. Also, common know!· 
edge tells us that it would take several thousand dollars 
just to extend the sewer mains, water mains, streets, 
and other necessary utilities from the subject property 
which is landlocked to a point where there can be 
secured available services from existing streets and 
utility improvements. 
As for the aspect of damage involving the severed 
6.44 acre tract for future use as an orchard, both Mr. 
Bingham (T. 27, 28) and his expert witness, Mr. Baum 
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(T. 98) pointed out that the travel considerations, loca-
tion, and the reduced size of that remaining tract all 
tended to diminish its value for its interim orchard 
use. 
It is easy to see that the access problem-even if 
a route could have in fact been secured from a northerly 
or other direction-could well constitute a lawsuit in 
itself to determine the cost of an alternate access 
through a substitute route. The additional costs-which 
would be measured as a severance aspect in this case 
-would be both very substantial and in the realm of 
a considerable amount of conjecture. It is a fair state-
ment to say that the injection of such a problem into 
this case would really open Pandora's box; likewise, 
it is easy to see why the plaintiff did not take upon 
itself the problem of securing for Mr. Bingham a route 
from a northerly direction. 
Perhaps Mr. Bingham's last appraiser, Thomas 
Baum, should be 9uoted at this point concerning this 
matter on his direct examination, particularly since he 
sets forth some of the problems involved ( T. 98-99) : 
Q. As to the land east of the freeway, explain 
to the jury the reasons for reducing the value 
as you did. 
A. The reason that I reduced the value on the 
remaining property, I used the rule of what 
a willing buyer would pay for that property 
in its present condition, after the date of 
acquisition. And of course I recognized that 
there is serious access problems to the prop-
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erty, either for any kind of a residential de- I, 
velopment or for its continued use as a orch- 1 
ard. I also recognized that the property is 
smaller now, and less economic to use either 
as an orchard or as a subdivision devel9p-
ment. There would be a higher percentage : 
of the property in roads, in a subdivision de-
velopment. There would be less interest from : 
the standpoint of prospective developers near 1 
a small property like that, than there would i 
have been in the total property, with all the 
utilities present in the street. This way he I 
would have a small property, and be faced , 
with the necessity of bringing utilities to the ~ 
property, including the street. 
Q. Did you consider on this problem of access, 
the apparently available 20'-length at the i 
upper northeast corner of the property? 
A. Yes, I took that into consideration. 
Q. And explain the effect you gave that in your 
deliberations. 
A. I was concerned with this access for several 
reasons. One, the only feasible method of get· 
ting into the property is over someone else's 
property, even though the 20 foot is still 
available. Too, that would involve possibly 
a severance damage to the property owner 
whose property you acquired the frontage 
from. I was concerned about it because there 
are easements over that edge of the property 
that involve several property owners on down ' 
the line. 
Then there is a water line that proceeds down 
over the upper edge of the high embank· ' 
ment, there is also an irrigation ditch, and 
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these things are expensive when other ad-
justments have to be made for the movement 
of irrigation water to the adjoining farms 
on to the south. 
I was further concerned by the steepness of 
the approach to the property, and its undesir-
ability. I have contacted the people who 
owned the corner property, and they're not 
anxious to have their property used as an 
access to the above property, and I recognize 
that there is going to be a prospective pur-
chaser acquiring that property that is going 
to be faced-if he develops the proper ac-
cess-with the necessity of a lawsuit to de-
velop a good access to the property, and that 
is an expensive item, and a thing that people 
won't take unwillingly. 
Q. Did you consider that in the event somehow 
one could get in thl'.ough this 20-foot area, 
that that would be suitable width for a sub-
division entry road? 
A. I didn't consider that direct access to the 
street to be suitable for any use. 
None of the landowners' witnesses considered that 
the landlocked parcel was valueless after the taking; 
rather, the landowners' appraisers placed a per-acre 
value on the remaining tract of $1,000.00 and $1,100.00, 
respectively; the plaintiff's expert witness placed a 
remaining value on the tract on a per-acre basis of 
$1,500.00. Concerning the residual value of the 6.44 
acre tract, Mr. Baum again testified on direct exami-
nation (T. 100-101): 
Q. Considering your remaining value of $1,000 
an acre for that piece, tell the Court and jury 
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why you arrived at that value, and your gen. , 
eral reasons for it. I 
A. Well, there are quite a number of reason~. I 
First of all I put myself in a position of a ! 
purchaser, and attempted to analyze as best 
I could a buyer that I took out to examine ! 
the property. And since I have had a lot of 
1
' 
experience showing buyers-not only the · 
ones that buy, but the ones that don't buy-
1 drew from my experience. Secondly, I ana- , 
lyzed the costs that would go through a buy. 
er's mind in acquiring this remaining prop- 1, 
erty. Part of them I had mentioned. i 
I feel that most buyers are not willing to I 
buy a lawsuit in the acquisition of property. 
They'd much rather acquire property that', 
these indeterminables are not present in. I / 
felt that there was some residual value in the 
1
• 
property, in that you could walk onto the' 
property, you could rise a horse onto it, and i 
it may Jiave some use at some time. People I 
would buy it for an investment, to the extent I 
that I felt that they would pay $1,000.00 for :
1 
the property. [ 
Q. You mean per acre? I 
A. Per acre. I felt that the costs of acquisition' 
of a right-of-way would involve something: 
in the neighborhood of $1,500.00 an acre. l '1 
also felt that the property is less valuable l 
in its smaller size than it was before, ana 
1
1 
where it was probably-Well, if there was 
adequate access to it, the property wou!O 
still not be worth $4,200.00 an acre as a sub·. 
division property, because it's smaller, 1! 1 
would take a higher percentage of it for r.o~~s. , 
it would be more costly to get the utihtie~ 
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to it than it would in its former condition. 
It was an ideal property formerly for an 
efficient development. 
Quite often considerable assistance can be fur-
nished by analyzing the testimony of the expert ap-
praisal witness for the opposition. In this respect Mr. 
Solomon, who was the expert valuation witness for the 
plaintiff-like Mr. Marsden-gave rather interesting 
testimony which does not appear to support the plain-
tiff's position ( T. 137) : 
Q. Now is your opinion based upon the assump-
tion that there would be no access possible 
to this land at the present time from the 
north? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And have you-
A. Oh, pardon me. No possible access. That 
there is no legally available access. 
Q. At the present time? 
A. There is a possible access, yes. 
Q. And it is based upon the assumption that at 
the present time there is no legal access from 
the property immediately adjacent on the 
east, in this little white triangle? (Indicating) 
A. No, sir. It is my assumption that there is 
the possibility of a development at the ex-
treme northeast corner of an access into the 
property that can be developed. 
Based upon the foregoing assumptions Mr. Solo-
mon testified that for the highest and best use of the 
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property for subdivision purposes the per-acre value 
of the 6.44 acres (as part of the 9.4 acres) was $3,500.0o 
per acre ( T. 139). He then outlined his reasons for 
reducing the value of the 6.44 acres immediately after 
the taking in the condition in which it was left, and 
then valued it at $1,500.00 per acre, or a total severance 
damage strictly applicable to the 6.44 acres of $2,000.00 
per acre. In short, Mr. Solomon followed the same basic 
approach of the other two appraisers as to damages 
to the 6.44 acre tract in arriving at his "after" value 
of $1,500.00 per acre (T. 138). The only real differ-
ence between Mr. Solomon's approach and that of the 
two expert a pp raisers for the property owners is that 
Mr. Solomon was somewhat less on the "before" value 
of the land and slightly higher on the "after" value 
of the 6.44 acre tract remaining. 
An analysis of l\!Ir. Solomon's reduction in value 
from $3,500.00 to $1,500.00 per acre indicates that he 
assigned what in effect amounted to a 57% damage 
from the original value of the subject property. If that 
same percentage of damage were applied to the ap· 
praisal values of the lands before the taking of $4,500.00 : 
per acre (Mr. Maw) or $4,200.00 per acre (Mr. Baum), 1 
the final severance award of $17,281.00 would be sub· : 
stantiated, within a very few hundred dollars, upon I 
Mr. Solomon's own approach. In other words, a 57% 
reduction in value, based on a "before" per acre value 
of $4,500.00 (as determined by the jury), multiplied 
1 
by 6.44 acres (plus an item of $285.00 damages to 1. 
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remaining properties west of the freeway) would con-
stitute a total of $16,803.00. Considering the severe 
nature of the problem incurred, it is rather amazing 
that the two appraisers for the property owners and 
the one appraiser for the plaintiff came up with ap-
praisal approaches so nearly comparable in an area of 
such difficulty. Further, Mr. Solomon's approach to 
damages conflicts with that of his client. 
CONCLUSION 
From an analysis of this case it is rather obvious 
that there was no reasonable means of access to the 6.44 
acre tract of land which was effectively landlocked 
by reason of the highway construction. Accordingly, 
both because (I) there was not in fact a suitable alter-
nate access which could have been secured, and ( 2) 
any such access that might have been secured would 
not have materially reduced the severance damages 
in this case, the Church Farm case and the Carlson case 
have no application to the situation before this Court. 
Even if defendants were required to sustain a burden 
of proof-which it is submitted is not the rule of law, 
as pointed out previously in this brief-the burden was 
amply met by the defendants. 
Complaint is made by the plaintiff that the Court 
refused to furnish the jury an instruction relating to 
mitigation of damages and burden of proof. It is the 
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position of these defendants that such an instruction I 
does not conform to the law and that, in any event, the 
matter of damages was adequately covered in the gen. 1 
eral instructions given by the Court relating to the 1 
measure of damages in a case of this type-Instructions : 
4, 5 and 7. In this respect it should be pointed out that : 
the plaintiff submitted approximately 13 instructions 
I 
of its own to the Court, but it did not see fit to submit ~ 
a written instruction to the Court relative to the matter i 
I 
of severance damages and any burden of proof relative 
to the efforts of the defendants in securing alternate ' 
access to their remaining properties. If plaintiff had ! 
I 
felt that issue to have been of importace in the case, ' 
one would think that it would have prepared and sub· ' 
mitted a formal instruction covering the point. 
It is submitted that the jury award in this matter 
was well within the evidence, that the lower Court was 
correct in denying the motion made by plaintiff for 
1 
a new trial, and that all other rulings of the lower Court 
were proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER and 
FREDERICK S. PRINCE, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
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